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There is an extensive literature on violent conflicts such 
as the 1994 Rwandan genocide, but few papers examine 
the profiles of victims and perpetrators, or more broadly 
the micro-level dynamics of widespread violence. This 
paper studies the demographic consequences of the 
Rwandan genocide and how the excess mortality due 
to the conflict was distributed in the population. Data 
collected by the 2000 Demographic and Health Survey 
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indicate that although there were more deaths across the 
entire population, adult males were the most likely to 
die. Using the characteristics of the survey respondent as 
a proxy for the socio-economic status of the family dead, 
the results also show that individuals with an urban or 
more educated background were more likely to die. Over 
and above the human tragedies, a long-term cost of the 
genocide is the country’s loss of productive skills.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper studies the long-term demographic consequences of the Rwandan 
genocide (1994) and, in particular, it analyzes how excess mortality was distributed in the 
population. This study complements earlier work by Verwimp (2003a, 2003b, 2004 and 
2005). The analysis uses the siblings’ mortality module of the 2000 Demographic and 
Health Survey (DHS) in Rwanda to analyze mortality during 1994. The maternal 
mortality module collects from female survey respondents the following information: 
number of brothers and sisters born from the biological mother of the respondent and, for 
each of the siblings; gender, survival status, age and age at death if relevant. De Walque 
(2005 and 2006) has used this method to analyze selective mortality during the Khmer 
Rouge Period in Cambodia. 
We find that the excess mortality of 1994 dramatically affected the population 
composition of Rwanda. Adult males were most likely to die, indicating that violent 
deaths represented a very large share of the excess mortality. Using the characteristics of 
the respondent sister as a proxy for the socio-economic status of the family, we also 
establish that individuals with an urban or educated background were more likely to die. 
We consider the possibility that these two results are driven by the fact that Tutsi were 
especially targeted by the 1994 genocide. Indeed, we find, using the 1992 Demographic 
and Health Survey, that Tutsi were more likely to be educated and to live in urban areas. 
Since ethnic variables have not been collected in the 2000 DHS, our analysis suffers from 
an omitted variable bias. We try to tackle this issue by using age at marriage as a proxy 
for being Tutsi. Even if we can only partially address the omitted variable bias, we can 
conclude that the genocide represented, over and above the human tragedies, a huge 
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groups of the population were more likely to be victims. 
The paper’s objective is to increase our understanding of the micro-level 
dynamics of violent conflict. Firstly, by analyzing the socio-economic characteristics of 
the victims, we better understand the direction of the violence, which brings us closer to 
the intentions or motivations of the perpetrator. Secondly, the analysis also adds insights 
into the long-term consequences of the 1994 genocide, in particular the loss of human 
capital. 
There is an extensive literature on the Rwandan genocide and other violent 
conflicts, but few papers address the profiles of victims or perpetrators, or more broadly 
the micro-level dynamics of the violence. Using a small sample from Northern Rwanda, 
André and Platteau (1998) found that land issues, land endowment and more general 
wealth and social status played an important role in the genocidal dynamic at the local 
level. Their sample was almost entirely Hutu. Kalyvas (2006) convincingly demonstrates 
that local participants in violence during civil war more often than not have other agendas 
than the macro-level narrative that is supposedly driving the conflict. Verwimp (2003b), 
using a small sample form southern Rwanda, shows that older and wealthy Rwandans 
had a higher propensity to be killed in the genocidal violence, even after controlling for 
ethnicity. Bundervoet (2009), in an analysis of victim profiles from the 1993 massacres in 
Burundi, finds that wealth in terms of livestock and human capital increased the 
propensity to be killed. De Walque (2005) shows that the Khmer Rouge particularly 
killed educated and urban residents. Akresh and de Walque (2008) found that the 1994 
genocide in Rwanda had a lasting negative impact on the educational achievement of 
children who were of school going age in 1994. A common result from the empirical 
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or genocide is not a random event. Victims are deliberately targeted, be it for their 
ethnicity, status, wealth, education, gender, religion or political conviction.    
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a short overview of the 
Rwandan genocide. Section 3 presents the methodology and the data. Section 4 describes 
the main results while section 5 addresses the omitted variable bias caused by the absence 
of the ethnic variable. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Short History of the Rwandan Genocide 
Between April and July 1994, between 500,000 and 800,000 Tutsi (Prunier, 
1995 ; Des Forges, 1999) or about 75% of the Tutsi population together with many Hutu 
who were known to be opponents of Habyarimana were killed by the Rwandan military 
(FAR), local police, national guard and militia called Interahamwe. A few years before, 
in October 1990, a group of rebels consisting of Tutsi refugees who had left Rwanda 
during the 1959-1962 revolution, together with their offspring, attacked Rwanda from 
Uganda. What followed was a civil war between the Rwandan armed forces (Forces 
Armées Rwandaises, FAR) and the rebel army (Rwandan Patriotic Front, RPF) in which 
the civilian population in the north of Rwanda was the main victim. While the RPF 
claimed to fight against the dictatorship of president Habyarimana, the latter claimed to 
represent the majority of the people. The battles between both armies were paralleled by 
peace negotiations and third party interventions. In order to understand the drama of this 
period, it is essential to know its history. 
The ethnic composition of the population had been a major issue in Rwandan 
politics since the time of colonization. The Belgian colonizer had first favoured the Tutsi 
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considered a people of cultivators. In the 1950s, with the spread of anti-colonial and 
independence movements, the ruling Tutsi began to claim the independence of Rwanda. 
At that time a Hutu counter-elite was given the chance to study at catholic seminars. With 
Belgian military and political aid, this new elite of Hutu leaders succeeded in overturning 
the ruling Tutsi regime and replace it by the leadership of the Parmehutu, the party for 
the emancipation of the Hutu.  Grégoire Kayibanda, a seminarian, became the first 
president. The ethnic divide however remained and was even strengthened. The new 
rulers, at the national as well as at the local level established their power by removing all 
Tutsi from positions of power. Ordinary Tutsi who were not associated with political 
power were also targets of reprisal and murder. For detailed treatment of the history of 
Rwanda, we refer to books written by G. Prunier (1995), C. Newbury (1988), D. De 
Lame (1996), F. Reyntjens (1994) and J.P. Chrétien (2000), among others. 
In 1973 a group of army officers around Juvénal Habyarimana took power by a 
coup d’état. They were frustrated by the monopolization of power by the group around 
Kayibanda, whose power base was the central prefecture of Gitarama. The group around 
Habyarimana, originating from northern Rwanda, saw all benefits of power go to the 
people from Gitarama. After the coup d’état, Habyarimana became the new president. He 
established the MRND (Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Dévéloppement), 
the single party whom every Rwandan was supposed to belong to by birth. Aided by high 
prices for the coffee, the country’s main export crop, in the late 1970s and generous 
donor support, Habyarimana was liked, or at least not contested, by a large part of the 
population. He did not abolish the ethnic identity cards and he forbade officers and 
soldiers to marry Tutsi wives. In order to control population movements, he set up a 
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He also had every adult participate in the Umuganda  (weekly communal labor), and 
institutionalized weekly animation sessions in honor of himself (Verwimp, 2003a). 
A key characteristic of the Habyarimana regime was its doctrine on the relation between 
population and land. The president had never been an advocate of a family planning 
policy. On several occasions he declared that children were the wealth of every Rwandan 
family. Groups set up by the Ministry of the Interior attacked pharmacies that sold 
condoms. The president was fully supported by the Catholic Church, which was 
omnipresent in Rwanda. The fertility rate of Rwandan women was among the highest in 
the world and the average size of cultivated land per family was shrinking rapidly from 
1.2 ha in 1984 to 0.9 ha in 1990 (National Agricultural Surveys, 1984 and 1989-1991). 
Many families had not enough land to earn a living and feed their families. In 1986, when 
discussing the fate of the 1959-1962 refugees, the Central Committee of the MRND said 
that their return was not possible because the country was overpopulated.  
During the civil war preceding the genocide (1990-1994), a number of local 
massacres occurred in which a total of 2,000 Tutsi were killed. These massacres were not 
spontaneous outburst of violence from a poor peasant population but were organized by 
the national power elite. On April 6
th, 1994 Habyarimana’s plane was shot down. After 
that, the genocide broke out. 
 
3. Methodology and Data Description 
We use the 1992 and the 2000 Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) for 
Rwanda. The 2000 survey includes a module collecting information on all the siblings of 
the respondent, including siblings who have died. The respondent is always an adult 
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death - also the date of death of all siblings of the adult female interviewed in the 2000 
DHS. One advantage of the mortality module is that it greatly increases the size of the 
population from which mortality estimates are calculated.  Using this module, we 
increase the number of cases in our analysis from roughly 10,000 adult females to close 
to 45,000 siblings of the survey respondents.  In addition, compared to many studies 
about mortality, it is not drawn from a sample of convenience (e.g. refugees), since the 
DHS are administered to a randomly selected representative sample of the population. 
There are however several methodological issues implied by using a sample of 
survivors. Even with a nationally representative sample, estimates based on a sample of 
survivors are potentially subject to several shortcomings (see for example, Heuveline, 
1998, 2001 (a), 2001 (b) about estimates of the number of deaths during the Khmer 
Rouge period in Cambodia). First, the method relies on recall of past events and is 
therefore possibly prone to misreporting. Several tests of data quality are performed in 
the DHS report and there does not seem to be systematic reporting biases; the sex ratios 
at birth are in the internationally acceptable range suggesting that there is no serious 
under- or over-reporting of brothers or sisters. Similarly, the median year of birth is the 
same for respondents as for siblings, indicating that there is no underreporting of older 
siblings. When more than one respondent in the same household reported on the same 
sibship, only one respondent was randomly retained.   
Given the way the adult mortality schedule is constructed, we miss entirely 
families in which only males were born and we are likely to under-represent families 
where a majority of males where born. But this is only likely to have an impact if we 
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was the case, as we will show) but also by the gender composition of one’s own sibship. 
Another methodological issue is that for siblings from a family to have a chance 
to be represented in the survey, at least one of the siblings need to have survived until the 
date of the survey. In other words, the survey misses the families where all siblings died 
and is likely to over-sample families with many survivors (Gakidou and King, 2006). 
This means that the survival probabilities of brothers and sisters are not independent. This 
is, therefore, likely to lead to an underestimation of the extent of the mortality. This 
problem is more likely to occur during extreme mortality crises, like the genocide in 
Rwanda, when the deaths among siblings might be highly correlated. To account for the 
unequal probability of selection into the sample, we weighted the data by a factor of the 
inverse of the number of surviving females age 15-49 in each family.   We will also not 
include the respondent in the counts, but only her siblings, because otherwise mortality 
would be further underestimated since, by definition, respondents are all survivors.   
  We should however keep the risk of underestimation of deaths in perspective. 
While it is correct that often, members of Tutsi households (parents and children living in 
the same dwelling) were killed at the same time, at the same place and by the same 
people (Verwimp, 2003), this is not the case for adult brothers and sisters who had 
already started their own households before the genocide. Married sisters and brothers do 
not live with each other but with their respective partners, thereby increasing the 
probability that at least one of the adult brothers or sisters survived the genocide.  Given 
that on average Rwandan mothers gave birth to eight children in the period covered by 
the 1992 and 2000 DHS, it is very likely that at least one of them will have survived the 
genocide. With the maternal mortality module, this is precisely what we are capturing: 
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members. 
Despite the shortcomings, the mortality estimates - derived from the siblings’ data 
from a large representative sample – offer useful insights. Even if they might 
underestimate the number of deaths, they provide an accurate measure of the impact of 
mortality on the current population structure of Rwanda. Such data also allow the 
analysis to address questions about the timing and the socio-economic distribution of 
excess mortality that cannot be answered with other approaches like the reconstruction 
approach that compares population counts and distributions from one census to the other 
(see for the case of Cambodia, Heuveline, 2001a and 2001b). 
In the siblings’ data collected in a nationally representative Demographic and 
Health Survey, there is no direct information on the socio-economic status of the siblings. 
However, by using information about the respondents, it is possible to proxy the socio-
economic status of the family. For example, the schooling levels of the female 
respondents can be considered a good indicator of the social and educational status of 
their family. For the type of residence, one variable indicates whether the respondent is 
living in a rural or an urban area. Combined with variables about migration history, this 
allows us, in most cases, to determine whether the family was living in a rural or an urban 
area in 1994. For individuals who never moved, or who moved for the last time before 
1994, the current residence is the residence in 1994. For individuals who moved after 
1994, the survey only records the type of residence immediately prior to the last move. If 
there was only one move between 1994 and 2000, this does not constitute a problem. If 
there have been several moves between 1994 and 2000, we cannot be certain of the type 
of residence in 1994, but we make the assumption that the type of residence (urban vs. 
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1. This 
gives us the type of residence in 1994 of the respondent sibling. We use this information, 
and the assumption that siblings share common characteristics and background to 
determine whether the other siblings have a rural or an urban background.    
The Rwanda 2000 DHS has one major drawback for the present analysis: it does 
not contain the ethnicity of the respondent. The Government of Rwanda no longer allows 
the registration of ethnicity, thereby complicating our analysis. It is namely generally 
acknowledged that the 1994 genocide targeted mainly Tutsi. Econometrically, this is the 
equivalent of an omitted variable problem. A variable, ethnicity, determines the 
probability to die and we cannot include it in the analysis. We address this problem in 
Section 5. 
 
4. Demographic and Socio-economic Distribution of Excess Mortality in 1994 
Our analysis proceeds in two steps: first, we provide descriptive statistics about 
trends in mortality for different categories (by gender, birth cohort and socio-economic 
status) as illustrated in figures 1-5. In a second stage, we will verify the robustness of the 
findings from the descriptive trends in a multivariate regression framework. 
Our results indicate that the excess mortality of 1994 dramatically affected the 
population composition of Rwanda. Figure 1 very simply plots, without any adjustment 
for the number and the age of individuals at risk in each year, the number of deaths 
reported among siblings in each year. It illustrates very clearly that excess mortality was 
heavily concentrated in 1994. 
                                                 
1 As a robustness check, we also relaxed this assumption and performed the analysis on the sub-
sample for which we had certainty about their rural/urban location before 1994. The results were very 
similar. 
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migrations, very poor health conditions and a cholera epidemic in refugee camps also 
contributed to the excess mortality. However, the distribution of the death probabilities 
by birth cohort in 1994, illustrated in figure 2, is evidence that a considerable proportion 
of the excess mortality is due to violent deaths, since it is not the birth cohorts most 
vulnerable to poor health and diseases (children and elderly adults), who experienced the 
highest mortality. Adults, and to a larger extent adult males, were most likely to die. 
Using the characteristics of the respondent sister as a proxy for the socio-
economic status of the family, figures 3, 4 and 5 establish that individuals with an urban 
or educated background were more likely to die. Figure 3 shows that at all ages, 
individuals with an urban background, i.e. siblings of women who lived in urban areas in 
1994, were more likely to die in 1994. That differential increases after age 15. Figures 4 
and 5 follow the same format for the educational background of individuals. Figure 4 
shows that siblings of women with at least some primary education were more likely to 
die, at adult ages, than individuals whose sister had no education. Figure 5 is constructed 
in the same way and establishes that individuals who had a sister who attended secondary 
school were more likely to experience excess mortality. In figure 5 which compares 
secondary education with lower schooling achievements, the magnitude of the 
differential is larger and extends over all ages, even if it still peaks among adults. Figures 
2 to 5 are very suggestive, but they only illustrate a univaried analysis.  
  In a second step, we perform a logit analyis estimating the following specification 
 
E (Yi) = Pi = L(α + βXi)  
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of sibling and family characteristics. The regressors of interest are the gender and 
dummies for the age of the sibling in 1994 and the rural and the educational background 
of the family. The data are weighed with the population weights provided in the DHS as 
well as with the inverse of the number of surviving females age 15-49 in each family and 
the standard errors are clustered by enumeration area.  
Table 1 confirms the results from the figures in a multivariate regression 
framework. The three panels display marginal effects of the coefficients in the above 
regression. The results indicate that, controlling for age, males and people with an 
educated and an urban background were more likely to die in 1994. Males were 1.3 
percentage points more likely to die, while individuals with a rural background are a little 
bit more than 3 percentage points less likely to have died. Each panel uses a different 
measure of education: panel A compares no education with at least some primary 
education (1.7 percentage point more likely to die), panel B compares at least some 
secondary education (4.5 percentage point more likely to have died) with lower 
educational achievements and panel C enters linearly the years of education (each 
additional year of education increases by 0.3 percentage point the probability to have 
died). 
 
5. The Omitted Variable Problem 
The 2000 DHS has one major drawback: it does not contain the ethnicity of the 
respondent. The ethnicity variable is determining the probability to die but we cannot 
include it in the analysis. Before using an econometric strategy to deal with this omitted 
variable problem, we should first note that Tutsi were not the only victims of the 1994 
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war with the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). The literature offers dramatic examples of 
this. Mamdami (2001) reports, for example, that, in order to escape killing, Tutsi girls 
‘had to dress and behave like peasants ‘implying that the victims were also targeted 
based on class (rich vs. poor or urban vs. rural). Since our dependent variable captures all 
deaths in 1994, not just in the three months of the genocide, it includes all deaths in the 
genocide and the war (Tutsi as well as Hutu) as well as deaths by disease (e.g. in the 
refugee camps in Democratic Republic of Congo).   
Our econometric strategy is as follows: the 1992 DHS contains the ethnicity of 
the respondents. We are thus able to analyse differences between Hutu and Tutsi in 1992. 
Panel A of table 2 analyzes the correlation between being Tutsi, and education and urban 
residence in the female sample of the 1992 DHS. The results show that even when 
controlling for region and age, there is a strong positive correlation between education, 
urban status and being Tutsi.  This confirms our fear that the relationship between 
mortality in 1994 and education and urban residence is at least partially driven by the fact 
that Tutsi were more likely to die during the genocide. 
Our next step is then to find a proxy for being Tutsi, a variable that would be 
correlated with Tutsi but that would not be correlated, by itself, i.e. independently from 
being Tutsi, with the probability of dying in 1994. We believe that the fact that Tutsi 
married at a later age satisfies these conditions. Panel B of table 2 indicates that even 
after controlling for education, urban residence, region and age, Tutsi women married 
later. Thus, age at marriage is positively correlated with being Tutsi. This fact had 
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at marriage for Hutu women was 22.6 and for Tutsi women 25.6
2  
We will further argue that the only reason that women who married later have 
been more likely to die in the genocide is because they were Tutsi. In other words, our 
assumption is that the genocide made more victims among people who married later, not 
because they were targeted as such, but because they were Tutsi - who happen to marry 
later. 
We therefore use in the 2000 DHS age at marriage as a proxy for being Tutsi. 
Once again, we do not have the age at marriage of the individuals whose mortality we are 
investigating, but we are using the age at marriage of their respondent sister as the proxy. 
Table 3 implements this strategy. Like table 1, it contains three panels for the three 
different measures of education: primary education dummy, secondary education dummy 
and years of education. Column 1 repeats the specifications of table 1 but adds age at 
marriage as a proxy for being Tutsi. This regression limits the sample to siblings of 
married women. However, since for a given age, being married might be correlated with 
being a Tutsi, we want to avoid this truncation of the sample. Column 2 therefore 
introduces, for the full sample, an interaction between being never married and age at 
marriage as the proxy for being Tutsi.  
We find that being never married and age at marriage are positively correlated 
with dying in 1994 (significant at the 10 percent level), which suggests that this is a good 
proxy. The coefficients on urban residence remain positive and significant, even after 
using the proxy in the three panels. The same is generally true for the coefficients on 
                                                 
2 Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat au 15 Aout 1991, Résultats Définitifs, 
Service National de Recensement, Ministère du Plan, Kigali, 1994, p. 186 
  14education, even though with primary education compared with no education, the 
coefficient is not significant in column 2 of panel A. This set of results is suggestive 
evidence that the positive relationship between education, urban residence and mortality 
during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda was general and was not only driven by the fact that 
the Tutsis - who were more educated and more likely to live in urban areas, were targeted 





This paper uses the maternal mortality module in Rwanda’s 2000 Demographic 
and Health Survey to analyze how excess mortality during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda 
was distributed in the population. We find that adult males were most likely to die, 
indicating that violent deaths represented a very large share of the excess mortality. Using 
the characteristics of the respondent sister as a proxy for the socio-economic status of the 
family, we also establish that individuals with an urban or educated background were 
more likely to die. 
The econometric strategy does not allow us to conclude that we completely solved 
the omitted variable bias due to the absence of the ethnic variable in the 2000 DHS. Age 
at marriage is only an imperfect proxy for being Tutsi. The coefficients on education and 
the type of residence in table 3 may still be picking up part of the ethnic effect. 
Nevertheless, we have gone one step further in addressing the omitted variable bias and 
our evidence suggests that, over and above targeting Tutsi, mortality in 1994 in Rwanda 
was more likely to be concentrated among the urban and educated groups of the 
population. We can certainly conclude that the genocide disproportionately affected 
educated and urban groups and therefore, over and above the lost lives, had a further 
  15impact in depriving Rwanda of its most skilled inhabitants. This is true independent of 
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Table 1: The socio-economic determinants of mortality in 1994 in Rwanda 
 
Dependent variable: Died in 1994 
 
A. Education is measured by comparing primary education with no education 
 
Male 0.013 
  [0.005]*** 
Sister with at least some primary education  0.017 
  [0.008]** 
Sister was living in an rural area in 1994  -0.035 
  [0.008]*** 
N =  44568 
 
B. Education is measured by comparing secondary education with lower schooling 
 
Male 0.013 
  [0.005]*** 
Sister with some secondary education  0.045 
  [0.016]*** 
Sister was living in an rural area in 1994  -0.032 
  [0.008]*** 
N =  44568 
 
C. Education is measured by the years of education 
 
Male 0.013 
  [0.005]*** 
Sister’s years of education  0.003 
  [0.001]*** 
Sister was living in an rural area in 1994  -0.032 
  [0.008]*** 
N =  44522 
 
Marginal effects of logit regressions, dummies for age in 1994 included. The data is taken from the siblings' 
mortality data of the Demographic and Health Survey, 2000, Rwanda. The data are weighted as 
recommended by the data provider, and adjusted to account for unequal probability of selection into the 
sample by a factor of 1/number of surviving females age 15-49 in each family.  When more than one 
respondent in the same household reports on the same sibship, only one respondent is randomly retained.  
The background of the family is derived from the characteristics of the sister who answered the survey. For 
sisters who never moved or moved for the last time before 1994, the actual location is recorded. Sisters 
who moved after 1994 are assumed to have been living in 1994 in the same type of location as the one 
reported, in 2000, as the previous one. Clustered standard errors between square brackets. ***, **, *: 
significant at the 1, 5 and, 10 percent confidence interval, respectively. 
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Table 2: The relationship between ethnicity, education, urban residence and age at 
marriage.  
Analysis of the 1992 Rwanda Demographic and Health Survey 
 
A.  Dependent variable: Indicator for being Tutsi (females only) 
 
Urban  0.066 0.063 0.056 
 [0.018]***  [0.027]**  [0.026] 
Years of education  0.009  0.007  0.008 
  [0.0013]*** [0.0012]*** [0.013]*** 
Region dummies  No  Yes  Yes 
Age  dummies  No No Yes 
N =   6498  6498 
 
6498 
B.  Dependent variable: age at marriage (Married females only) 
 
Tutsi 1.325 1.238 1.145 
  [0.216]*** [0.220]*** [0.208]*** 
Urban  0.138 0.151 0.063 
  [0.171] [0.178] [0.169] 
Years of education  0.178  0.173  0.190 
  [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** 
Region dummies  No  Yes  Yes 
Age  dummies  No No Yes 
N =   4341  4341  4341 
Marginal effects of logit regressions in panel A, linear regressions in panel B. The data is taken from the 
Demographic and Health Survey, 1992, Rwanda. The data are weighted as recommended by the data 
provider. Clustered (by enumeration area) standard errors between square brackets. ***, **, *: significant 
at the 1, 5 and, 10 percent confidence interval, respectively. 
 
  19  20
 
Table 3: The socio-economic determinants of mortality in 1994 in Rwanda, using age 
at marriage as a proxy for ethnicity 
 
Dependent variable: Died in 1994 
A. Education is measured by comparing primary education with no education 
 (1)  (2) 
Male 0.018  0.013 
[0.006]*** [0.005]*** 
Sister with primary education  0.024  0.014 
[0.010]*** [0.009] 
Sister was living in an rural area in 1994  -0.022  -0.036 
[0.010]** [0.008]*** 
Never married  -  0.069 
 [0.032]** 
Age at marriage if married  0.003  0.003 
[0.001]** [0.001]** 
N =   31523  44568 
  
B. Education is measured by comparing secondary education with lower schooling 
Male 0.019  0.013 
[0.006]*** [0.005]*** 
Sister with secondary education  0.045  0.040 
[0.020]** [0.016]*** 
Sister was living in an rural area in 1994  -0.022  -0.033 
[0.010]** [0.008]*** 
Never married  -  0.061 
 [0.031]** 
Age at marriage if married  0.003  0.002 
[0.001]** [0.001]* 
N =   31523  44568 
  
C. Education is measured by the years of education 
Male 0.019  0.013 
[0.006]*** [0.005]*** 
Years of education (of sister)  0.004  0.003 
[0.001]*** [0.001]** 
Sister was living in an rural area in 1994  -0.020  -0.034 
[0.010]** [0.008]*** 
Never married  -  0.061 
 [0.032]* 
Age at marriage if married  0.003  0.002 
[0.001]* [0.001]* 
N =   31496  44522 
Marginal effects of logit regressions, dummies for age in 1994 included. The data is taken from the siblings' 
mortality data of the Demographic and Health Survey, 2000, Rwanda. The data are weighted as 
recommended by the data provider, and adjusted to account for unequal probability of selection into the 
sample by a factor of 1/number of surviving females age 15-49 in each family.  Where more than one 
respondent in the same household reports on the same sibship, only one respondent is randomly retained. 
The background of the family is derived from the characteristics of the sister who answered the survey. For 
sisters who never moved or moved for the last time before 1994, the actual location is recorded. Sisters 
who moved after 1994 are assumed to have been living in 1994 in the same type of location as the one 
reported, in 2000, as the previous one. Clustered standard errors between square brackets. ***, **, *: 
significant at the 1, 5 and, 10 percent confidence interval, respectively.Figure 1: Number of deaths by year among siblings of women aged 15-49. Rwanda 



























































  21Figure 2: Death probability in 1994, by age and gender. 





























  22Figure 3: Death probability by rural/urban location of family in 1994. 
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  23Figure 4: Death probability by educational background of the family. 
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Figure 5: Death probability in 1994 by level of education of the sister. 
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